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Abstract 
This paper argues that breast cancer prognosis potentially produces a circular dialectic in which a) the 
subject is compelled to perceive the body as vulnerable and separate (alien) to the self, and the 
treatments required make the body more vulnerable, more alien and b) this is held in tension with the fact 
that the very alienation and heightened vulnerability of the body in breast cancer treatment is productive; 
it collapses the boundaries through which the body and self are understood, often demands a conscious 
intimacy of/with the body, and points to critical enactments and understandings of embodied subjectivity. 
I use the concept of dialectics here in a broad sense then, to mark the interaction of apparently conflicting 
states. While vulnerability is generally thought of as a somato-ontology to be avoided, and as a 
constraining, negative mode of being, through a shift in perspective it also appears as an enabling state. I 
argue that vulnerability might be seen as a relational ontology between flesh and self that is both 
restrictive and generative, where the restriction itself can be generative. Understanding vulnerability in this 
way might engender the critical politicization of risk and function as the place from which a radically 
altered/re-conceived politics proceeds. Such a politics would be ethico-political work around the issue of 
cancer. It would, perhaps, function ultimately as an ethics of vulnerability, foregrounding critical 
responsibility towards oneself, one’s life, the life of others, and the life of the community. 
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ABSTRACT: This essay argues that breast cancer prognosis potentially 
produces a dialectic in which the subject is compelled to perceive the 
body as vulnerable and separate (alien) to the self and that the treat-
ments required make the body more vulnerable and more alien, and 
that this is held in tension with the fact that the very alienation and 
heightened vulnerability of the body in breast cancer treatment are 
productive. Such alienation and vulnerability collapse the bound- 
aries through which the body and self are understood, often demand 
a conscious intimacy of/with the body, and point to critical enact-
ments and understandings of embodied subjectivity. 
“I have had to face the fact that I am totally vulnerable, able to die, 
to feel terror, to be terrorized.” 
—Jo Spence1
The body in cancer prognosis is a vulnerable body. The prognosis—
understood as the projected likely outcome or course of disease—
confirms this body as at risk and operates as a foretelling, a forebod-
ing of what is to come: it forecasts the future, opens the body/self 
up to certain particularities of medical intervention, and determines 
the course of treatment. At the level of individual experience, to live 
in the folds of prognosis can be said to produce a sense of vulnera-
bility stemming from an interruption to generally accepted notions 
1. Jo Spence, Putting Myself in the Picture: A Political, Personal and Photographic 
Autobiography (London: Camden Press, 1986).
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of corporeal mastery, wholeness, and integrity.2 For, while in domi-
nant Cartesian narratives the sovereignty of self supposedly follows 
from a sovereignty of corpus, to live in prognosis generally means 
that one’s body is experienced as uncontrolled, or out of one’s con-
trol, that surgery might be required and therefore bodily wholeness, 
which underscores notions of bodily integrity, may be compromised 
through cutting off/out parts. But the prognosis is only always a 
predictive abstraction: it anticipates the probability of susceptibil-
ity to disease, the likelihood of death. The prognosis never poses 
a surety, and this, in itself, means that to live in prognosis is not 
only to be vulnerable, but also to be actively made subject to precar-
ity: the body’s contingency and potentiality—in terms of illness and 
health, normality and abnormality, capacity and incapacity, mortal-
ity and morbidity—become the inalienable stuff of everyday life. To 
live in prognosis is thus to live in a state of vulnerability—to live, 
ultimately, with certain uncertainty. 
 While cancer prognosis works in broad terms to produce these 
states, my aim in this essay is to think through various forms of 
vulnerability represented by and initiated through the particulari-
ties of living in prognosis following breast cancer diagnosis. Many of 
these particularities arise due to the gender-laden meanings associ-
ated with breast cancer, such that “[w]hile other cancers and other 
diseases are undoubtedly as significant in terms of their ultimate 
outcomes, a contemporary diagnosis of breast cancer is also satu-
rated with murkier concerns about identity, body image, and self 
worth.”3 In her phenomenology of “breasted experience,” for in-
stance, Iris Marion Young has noted the complex ways in which het-
eronormative culture compels an intimate linking between breasts 
and women’s sense of self.4 And, while writers like Audre Lorde have 
challenged these heternormative associations, the disease remains 
enmeshed with conceptualizations of women’s identity and sexual-
2. Arthur Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995); Lisa Deidrich, “A Bioethics of Failure: Anti-heroic Cancer 
Narratives,” in Ethics of the Body: Postconventional Challenges, ed. Margrit Shildrick and 
Renata Mykitiuk (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 135–152; Michael Bury, Health 
and Illness (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005); Kathy Charmaz, “The Body, Identity, and 
Self: Adapting to Impairment,” Sociological Quarterly 36:4 (1995): 657–680; Sarah 
Lochlann Jain, “Living in Prognosis: Toward an Elegiac Politics,” Representations 98 
(2007): 77–92.
3. Alexandra Leigh McCarthy, “A Rebellious Distemper: A Foucaultian History of Breast 
Cancer to 1900” (Ph.D. diss., Queensland University of Technology, 2005), p. 12.
4. Iris Marion Young, Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and 
Social Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 189.
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ity, precisely because of the broader centrality of breasts to social 
understandings of femininity.5 
The scholarship dealing with these questions of embodiment, 
identity, and breast cancer is vast, to say the least; it traverses studies 
in the areas of health and nursing,6 historical studies of the disease,7 
studies of breast cancer activism,8 and a panoply of affective histo-
ries of breast cancer experience. While accounts such as these have 
provided complex ways for understanding breast cancer, they have 
not necessarily, nor explicitly, been attentive to the concept of vul-
nerability.9 Let me be careful here to stipulate that I am not suggest-
ing that these accounts do not address corporeal vulnerability, but, 
rather, that they do not foreground vulnerability as a framework 
through which to think about embodiment as it relates to breast 
cancer. It is this idea that interests me in what follows. 
 Similarly, corporeal vulnerability is conspicuously absent in 
broader breast cancer culture. As Barbara Ehrenreich has so pow-
5. Audre Lorde, The Cancer Journals (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1980).
6. See, for instance, Dorothy H. Broom, “Reading Breast Cancer: Reflections on a 
Dangerous Intersection,” Health 5:2 (2001): 249–268; Roanne Thomas-McLean, 
“Memories of Treatment: The Immediacy of Breast Cancer,” Qualitative Health Research 
14:5 (2004): 628–643; Jody Pelusi, “The Lived Experience of Surviving Breast Cancer,” 
Oncology Nursing Forum 24:8 (1997): 1343–1353; Cathy Charles, Cristina Redko, Tim 
Whelan, Amiram Gafini, and Leonard Reyno, “Doing Nothing Is No Choice: Lay 
Constructions of Treatment Decision-Making Among Women with Early Stage Breast 
Cancer,” Sociology of Health and Illness 20 (1998): 71–95; E. A. Crockford, I. M. Holloway, 
and J. M. Walker, “‘Nurses’ Perceptions of Patients’ Feelings about Breast Surgery,” 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 18:11 (1993): 1710–1718; Samantha Crompvoets, Breast 
Cancer and the Postsurgical Body: Recovering the Self (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006); and Maria M. Arman and Arne A. Rehnsfeldt, “The Hidden Suffering among 
Breast Cancer Patients: A Qualitative Metasynthesis,” Qualitative Health Research 13:4 
(2003): 510–527.
7. Barron H. Lerner, The Breast Cancer Wars: Fear, Hope, and the Pursuit of a Cure in 
Twentieth-Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Robert A. 
Aronowitz, Unnatural History: Breast Cancer and American Society (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); James S. Olson, Bathsheba’s Breast: Women, Cancer, and History 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
8. See Samantha King, Pink Ribbons, Inc.: Breast Cancer and the Politics of Philanthropy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Maren Klawiter, The Biopolitics of 
Breast Cancer: Cultures of Disease and Activism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008); and Gayle A. Sulick, Pink Ribbon Blues: How Breast Cancer Culture 
Undermines Women’s Health (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
9. This is not to say that vulnerability has not been the focus of much academic work 
(see, for instance, the accounts I discuss below). As I go on to note, vulnerability has 
been theorized as a concept. However, the lived reality of vulnerability is not specifically 
addressed in either academic literature on breast cancer or in public campaigning 
around the disease. I am noting an empirical, rather than a conceptual, problem here. 
116 Configurations
erfully noted, the relentless “survivor narrative” that underscores 
breast cancer campaigning can be seen to eclipse vulnerability by 
reproducing a “mindless triumphalism . . . that denigrates the dead 
and the dying.”10 This rhetoric “offers . . . the benefits of spiritual 
upward mobility,” providing the opportunity for women to improve 
their lives through “becoming strong” and “surviving.” Such a nar-
rative, however, situates the dead and the dying as having failed, 
Ehrenreich warns, in that they have failed to survive and, therefore, 
failed to have cancer improve their lives. What would it mean, in-
stead, to contemplate embodied vulnerability, to take more seri-
ously the permeability of bodily boundaries, and to grapple with the 
precarities of living in breast cancer prognosis?
 In this essay, I do not aim to map out an empirical terrain of 
breast cancer experience; rather, I move toward new ways of think-
ing about vulnerability—specifically, as it might work or exist in 
relation to breast cancer treatment and to living inside the tempo-
ral and epistemological folds of breast cancer prognosis. In doing 
so, I hope to make a contribution to both breast cancer literature 
(and considerations for activism) and scholarship on embodied vul-
nerability. Most particularly, I want to suggest that breast cancer 
prognosis potentially produces a dialectic in which the subject is 
compelled to perceive the body as vulnerable and separate (alien) 
to the self and that the treatments required make the body more 
vulnerable and more alien, and that this is held in tension with 
the fact that the very alienation and heightened vulnerability of the 
body in breast cancer treatment are productive: they collapse the 
boundaries through which the body and self are understood, often 
demand a conscious intimacy of/with the body, and point to critical 
enactments and understandings of embodied subjectivity. I use the 
concept of dialectics here in a broad sense, then, to mark the interac-
tion of seemingly conflicting states. While vulnerability is generally 
thought of as a bodily state of being—or what I am calling a somato-
ontology—to be avoided and as a constraining, negative mode of be-
ing, through a shift in perspective, it also appears as an enabling 
state. I argue that vulnerability might instead be seen as a relational 
ontology between flesh and self that is both restrictive (limiting cor-
poreal possibilities) and generative (creating new realities), where the 
restriction itself can generate new modalities of embodied selfhood, 
community, and politics. 
 In exploring these ideas, I am guided by feminist cultural studies 
10. Barbara Ehrenreich, “Welcome to Cancerland: A Mammogram Leads to a Cult of 
Pink Kitsch,” Harper’s, November 2001, pp. 43–53, quote on p. 53.
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and poststructuralist conceptualizations of embodiment as always-
already formed in and through specific relations of power. Most par-
ticularly, this analysis is underscored by Foucauldian understandings 
of the body and subjectivity as inextricable, the body as an instru-
ment and effect of power, and of medicine as “a power-knowledge 
that can be applied to both the body and the population, both the 
organism and biological processes, and . . . [as that which has] both 
disciplinary effects and regulatory effects.”11 In this vein, medical 
treatment for breast cancer can be viewed as a disciplinary means of 
bringing subjects in line with particular regularizing and regulatory 
norms of health, and that which produces particular kinds of bod-
ies and understandings of vulnerability, subjectivity, and relations 
of subjects to embodiment. In what follows, however, I look to a 
series of affective histories (or stories of living with cancer), namely 
by Ehrenreich,12 Jackie Stacey,13 and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,14 and 
to the ethno-critical studies of Nina Hallowell,15 Sarah Lochlann 
Jain,16 Dorothy Broom and Anne Kavanagh,17 and Lenore Mander-
son18 to highlight that living in cancer prognosis often slips out of 
these dominant understandings, producing complicated relations to 
vulnerability and notions of body and self. While these accounts are 
heterogeneous, they are linked by a shared insistence that vulner-
ability be thought of not as a bodily state (a somato-ontology) to be 
simply abated or disciplined, but, rather, as that which is grappled 
with as a relational ontology: the (vulnerable) body is never separate 
from (one’s sense of) self, and an interactivity exists between body 
11. Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–
1976, trans. David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertaini and Alessandro Fontana (New York: 
Picador, 2003), p. 252. 
12. Ehrenreich, “Welcome to Cancerland” (above n. 10).
13. Jackie Stacey, Teratologies: A Cultural Study of Cancer (London: Routledge, 1997).
14. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Breast Cancer: An Adventure in Applied Deconstruction,” 
in Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader, ed. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 153–156.
15. Nina Hallowell, “Reconstructing the Body or Reconstructing the Woman? Problems 
of Prophylactic Mastectomy for Hereditary Breast Cancer Risk,” in Ideologies of Breast 
Cancer: Feminist Perspectives, ed. Laura K. Potts (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd, 
2000), pp. 153–180.
16. Jain, “Living in Prognosis” (above, n. 2).
17. Dorothy Broom and Anne Kavanagh, “Embodied Risk: My Body, Myself?” Social 
Science and Medicine 46:3 (1997): 437–444.
18. Lenore Manderson, “Gender, Normality and the Post-surgical Body,” Anthropology 
and Medicine 6:3 (1999): 381–394.
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and self. In calling on these accounts, the questions central to this 
essay are: What happens to the vulnerable body in breast cancer 
prognosis? What is it to live in a state of vulnerability initiated by 
the diagnosis of breast cancer and subsequent prognosis (what is 
restricted or disabled)? What are the potentialities of the body in 
breast cancer prognosis (what is produced or enabled)? To address 
these questions, I turn first to considering how vulnerability can be 
understood as a somato-ontology; in the second part of the essay, 
I move to a more specific focus on breast cancer and consider how 
vulnerability might be more productively understood as a relational 
ontology.
The Precarious Body: Vulnerability as Somato-Ontology
In a Foucauldian understanding, the body is a target of control, sur-
veillance, and regulation. The body became a focal point or nexus 
for disciplinary power, according to Foucault, from the eighteenth 
century; through situating the body as an object of power/knowl-
edge relations, various state apparatuses established norms of corpo-
real functioning and set boundaries between distinct “types” of bod-
ies. The aim of disciplinary power has to been to produce politically 
and economically productive and useful subjects, and one of the 
primary means to achieve this has been by focusing on the health 
of the individual and the population. In The Birth of the Clinic, Dis-
cipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality, and the lectures published 
as Society Must Be Defended, Foucault identifies medicine as a key 
power/knowledge apparatus and institution of power that has been 
instrumental in constructing bodies as normal or abnormal and, 
consequently, as controlled or in need of control.19 Through his 
archaeology of medical perception in The Birth of the Clinic, Fou-
cault argued that the medico-scientific gaze situates the body within 
a grid of intelligibility as an object to be analyzed, as an object of 
knowledge: “In anatomo-clinical experience, the medical eye must 
see the illness spread before it, horizontally and vertically in graded 
depth, as it penetrates into the body, as it advances into its bulk, as 
it circumvents or lifts its masses, as it descends into its depths.”20 
Here, the body can be “known” and regulated according to that 
 
19. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. 
A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage, 1994); Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Penguin, 1991); The History of Sexuality, 
vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge, trans. R. Hurley (London: Penguin, 1998); “Society Must 
Be Defended” (above, n. 11).
20. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (above n. 19), p. 167.
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knowing, with the aim being to “discipline sickness in the name of 
health.”21 
 As Margrit Shildrick notes, these ways of knowing are premised 
on a modernist discourse that “figure[s] the human body, or at least 
the white male body, as ideally closed and invulnerable.”22 In A 
Body Worth Defending, Ed Cohen follows this line of thought to ar-
gue that, from the late seventeenth century, the body is understood 
as individualized, monadic, and as a property of the self.23 Further 
augmenting the mind/body or self/body dualism, this logic assumes 
that the “self has a body that it defends” and, simultaneously, that 
the body forms a “defensible boundary” between the self and the 
world.24 The integrity of the subject, according to Cohen, can only 
be maintained through a boundary defense that defends against 
vulnerability. Vulnerability is taken to be a shortcoming—one that 
discursively positions the subject as weak or unfortunate—and as 
that which marks the subject as potentially beyond the normative 
standards of being, as they have been formulated within the medico- 
discursive model of health. This is not to say that vulnerability is de-
nied; indeed, it is taken as a constitutive precondition of existence. 
Instead, “the ‘proper’ unfolding of human life, and the exercise of 
selfhood, is taken to overcome such dangers.”25 
 Judith Butler echoes the notion that vulnerability is the very 
condition of embodiment: “in its surface and its depth, the body 
is a social phenomenon: it is exposed to others, vulnerable by 
definition.”26 For Butler, this vulnerability stems from the real-
ity that “the very persistence” of the body “depends upon social 
conditions and institutions, which means that in order to ‘be,’ in 
the sense of ‘persist,’ it must rely on what is outside itself.”27 To be 
vulnerable, then, is to be exposed, both to others and to things or 
events beyond the individual’s control. But, precisely because this 
exposure is inextricable from existence, there are no invulnerable 
21. Nikolas Rose, “Medicine, History, and the Present,” in Reassessing Foucault: Power, 
Medicine and the Body, ed. Colin Jones and Roy Porter (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1994), 
pp. 48–72, quote on p. 68.
22. Margrit Shildrick, “Becoming Vulnerable: Contagious Encounters and the Ethics of 
Risk,” Journal of Medical Humanities 21:4 (2000): 215–227, quote on p. 217. 
23. Ed Cohen, A Body Worth Defending: Immunity, Biopolitics, and the Apotheosis of the 
Modern Body (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).
24. Ibid., p. 75 (emphasis in original).
25. Shildrick, “Becoming Vulnerable” (above, n. 22), p. 217.
26. Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (New York: Verso, 2009), p. 33. 
27. Ibid.
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bodies. If this is the case—if to live is to be vulnerable—cancer pro-
duces a very particular modality of vulnerability that is the product 
of both external and internal factors. Cancer may be caused from 
exposure to environmental toxicity and, as a phenomenon, it ren-
ders one dependent on social institutions—such as the clinic, the 
hospital, access to medical care and health insurance—in order to 
detect risk, mitigate vulnerability, and to treat the disease.28 In these 
ways, the subject is made vulnerable to and by external forces. But 
cancer is also very much about risk or vulnerability that is seen to 
inhere in or be caused by the body/subject and, therefore, to be the 
product of internal factors.29 It is these internal factors that, for the 
subject in breast cancer prognosis, most clearly register as a vulner-
ability to vital processes.
 In each of these framings, corporeal vulnerability is understood 
as a somato-ontology. In using this term I refer simply to the fact 
that vulnerability has been configured as a bodily (somato) truth (on-
tology): a truth relating to and of the body, or a truth of the nature 
of bodily being. In this understanding, as I have outlined, the body 
is always-already physiologically vulnerable (to the world and in the 
face of precarity) simply by virtue of being alive. But paradoxically, 
as Shildrick has noted in Embodying the Monster, the very idea of an 
autonomous self is based on a series of exclusions, one of which 
is vulnerability, a state that she, Butler, and Cohen have argued is 
coextensive with existence. What I am calling the somato-ontology 
of vulnerability—this condition of being—indeed threatens the self 
and notions of self-containment: it is “characterised . . . as a nega-
28. On environmental toxicity, risk, and breast cancer, see Phaedra Carmen Pezzullo, 
Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of Travel, Pollution, and Environmental Justices (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2007); Klawiter, The Biopolitics of Breast Cancer (above, n. 
8); and Laura K. Potts, “An Epidemiology of Women’s Lives: The Environmental Risk 
of Breast Cancer,” Critical Public Health 14:2 (2004): 133–147.
29. Here, I am referring specifically to embodied risks, which are those risks presumed to 
be located in the bodies of individuals. Susceptibility to this form of risk is distinguished 
from lifestyle risks, which are supposedly produced by an individual’s actions. Both 
embodied and lifestyle risks, however, are about the internal functioning or mechanics 
of the body (even with lifestyle risks, the development of cancer depends on the body’s 
response to behavior that is deemed risky—for example, smoking) and are, as such, 
more about internality than exposure to external forces. On the distinctions among 
embodied, environmental, and lifestyle risks in relation to cancer, see Broom and 
Kavanagh, “Embodied Risk” (above, n. 17). My claim, as I go on to discuss, is that 
individuals (largely) and biomedical discourse frame cancer as an individualized disease 
caused by internal functioning. While there are, of course, external factors that cause 
cancer, these are often eclipsed—in individual understandings of the disease, in 
biomedical rhetoric, and in dominant forms of public campaigning around breast 
cancer.
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tive attribute, a failure of self-protection, that opens the self to the 
potential of harm.”30 It is, then, inherent to existence, but nonethe-
less (or perhaps precisely because of this) to be defended against. 
In reference to health especially, the somato-ontology of vulnera-
bility is disciplined, managed, and regulated in relation to medico- 
discursive knowledges that prescribe particular modes of embodi-
ment and conceptualizations of health. Medicine thus becomes 
“a political intervention-technique with specific power effects,”31 
and the body is objectively figured—and often subjectively under-
stood—as that which can and must be governed. Importantly, the 
individual is called on to incorporate this relation to their bodies 
(this idea of vulnerability as a bodily state to be abated) and to regu-
late (and produce) themselves as particular kinds of subjects in the 
name of “health” and through specific medico-juridical techniques. 
As Elizabeth Grosz notes, “subjects thus produced are not simply the 
imposed results of alien, coercive forces”;32 instead, subjects partici-
pate in these techniques of regulation through their active engage-
ment with medical protocols and norms: because what medicine of-
fers is “the possibility of vanquishing the sufferings of the flesh, or 
at least postponing them, through the instrumentalization of life by 
medical criteria and procedures.”33 
 Such participation is, in large part, compelled by a certain medi-
cal morality that has arisen around issues of health and illness, 
where the mitigation of vulnerability has increasingly come to be 
seen as an individual responsibility inter-articulated with a judg-
30. Margrit Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self (London: 
Sage Publications, 2002), p. 1. In this work, Shildrick offers a sustained examination of 
vulnerability in relation to the nonnormative “monstrous” body. In reference to my 
arguments here, two salient points emerge from her work: first, all bodies are always-
already vulnerable, and this vulnerability is seen as negative and to be waged against 
in order to become an autonomous subject who is protected, clean, and proper; second, 
and simultaneously, vulnerability is the condition of our emergence and constitutive 
of the self—an idea that, as she says, “shatters the ideal of the self’s clean and proper 
body” (p. 86). Acknowledging this paradox of vulnerability requires, she argues, that 
we pursue an ethics of risk. While I have taken up these ideas elsewhere, particularly 
the idea of an ethics of risk (“Risking Safety: Breast Cancer and the Body in Prognosis” 
(Journal of Medical Humanities, forthcoming), due to space constraints I am unable to 
explore these arguments in any detail here.
31. Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended” (above, n. 11), p. 252.
32. Elizabeth Grosz, “Inscriptions and Body Maps: Representations and the Corporeal,” 
in Masculine/Feminine and Representation, ed. Terry Threadgold and Anne Cranny-
Francis (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990), pp. 62–74, quote on p. 65.
33. Rose, “Medicine, History, and the Present,” (above, n. 21), p. 68.
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ment: vulnerability is seen, as Shidrick notes, as a “falling short”34 
that must be curtailed. Thus, to avoid the risk of breast cancer—one 
that is positioned as always-already potentially residing in the fe-
male body—the individual must “formulate life strategies, to seek to 
maximize their life chances, to take actions or refrain from actions 
in order to increase the quality of their lives, and to act prudently in 
relation to themselves and others.”35 As Nancy Press, Jennifer Fish-
man, and Barbara Koenig have argued, for instance, women are ad-
vised to partake in vigilant breast monitoring (in the form of self-ex-
ams or mammography), to minimize their lifestyle risks or potential 
vulnerabilities through regulating their diet, reproductive behavior, 
stress, and exercise, to research and document their family history 
(and, if necessary, undergo genetic screening), and to keep up to 
date with the latest biomedical/scientific knowledge.36 Only a brief 
survey of common slogans in international breast-cancer-awareness 
advertisements highlights this imperative for individual responsibil-
ity: “Protect yourself against breast cancer”; “Cancer: If it takes you 
too long to find it, it may be too late”; “It’s in your breast inter-
est to have both”; “Unfortunately we can’t test everything for you”; 
“Don’t let breast cancer eclipse your life: examine yourself today.”37 
The self is thus interpellated as an active agent who must abate vul-
nerability, and medicine is generally constructed as enabling self-
empowerment because, as Stuart Murray has suggested, “[w]e are . . 
. told that medicine is the cure to the problem of the self, the prin-
cipal technology by which the self ought to relate to itself, through 
the body.”38 
 To be diagnosed with breast cancer is to have vulnerability con-
firmed as a certainty. While the self may have always been vulner-
able and called on to act or assume certain disciplinary techniques 
in relation to this somato-ontology, the diagnosis captures this gen-
34. Shildrick, Embodying the Monster (above n. 30), p. 76.
35. Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the 
Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 107.
36. Nancy Press, Jennifer R. Fishman, and Barbara A. Koenig, “Collective Fear, 
Individualized Risk: The Social and Cultural Context of Genetic Testing for Breast 
Cancer,” Nursing Ethics 7:3 (2000): 237–249. Also see Susan Yadlon, “Skinny Women 
and Good Mothers: The Rhetoric of Risk, Control, and Culpability in the Production of 
Knowledge about Breast Cancer,” Feminist Studies 23:3 (1997): 645–677, for a discussion 
of risk avoidance and breast cancer.
37. Women Health Zone, “Most Creative Breast Cancer Awareness Ads.” http://www 
.womenhealthzone.com/womens-health/breast-cancer/breast-cancer-awareness-ads/. 
38. Stuart Murray, “Care of the Self: Biotechnology, Reproduction, and the Good Life,” 
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2:6 (2007): 1–15, quote on p. 5. 
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eralized disciplinary function. Now the subject is entered into, and 
called on to actively enter themselves into, specific kinds of medical 
discipline depending on the grade of cancer (the rate of cancerous 
cell growth that marks its aggressiveness: graded 1 to 3, with 3 being 
the most aggressive/quick growing) and the stage (determined by 
the size of the tumor, whether lymph nodes are involved and the 
cancer has spread: ranked 1 to 4, with 4 indicating that the cancer 
has metastasized to other parts of the body). The particularities of 
grade and stage mark out differential vulnerabilities, which are fur-
ther compounded by the ability to access care and other features of 
a raced and classed stratified society, and firmly situate the subject 
in relation to specific medico-disciplinary apparatuses, whether that 
be surgery, hormone therapy, chemotherapy, or radiation. Follow-
ing the diagnosis, prognosis (which stems from diagnostic particu-
larities) offers the statistical calculations of the likelihood of death.39 
But this prognosis, as Jain notes, “poses both a stunningly specific 
(one has an x percent chance of being alive in five years) and blood-
lessly vague (you, yourself, will either be dead or alive) fact about 
the future.”40 The prognosis, then, operates to actively position the 
subject in relation to the precarious roulette of futurity.
 The prognosis is attached to the individual’s body, which is itself 
seen as the source of vulnerability. Looking to a range of affective 
histories and ethno-critical studies highlights that this body is po-
sitioned within the medical model as having diverged from normal 
operation, as having “gone wrong.”41 These affective and ethno-
critical accounts demonstrate that medical power/knowledge rela-
tions implicitly assume that the body is stable, fixed, and a given, 
and only differentiates bodies in terms of health and disease, and 
normality and abnormality. In very basic terms, this model is predi-
cated on a paradigm of reading the body that is indebted to the Car-
tesian logic of a mind/body split.42 Within this understanding, res 
39. Rebecca Herzig and Sarah L. Jain, “Commentary: Surviving Terrorist Cells,” 
Academic Medicine 84:1 (2009): 11–12.
40. Jain, “Living in Prognosis” (above, n. 2), p. 78.
41. The ethno-critical studies I am looking at are Hallowell, “Reconstructing the Body 
or Reconstructing the Woman?” (above, n. 15); Broom and Kavanagh, “Embodied 
Risk” (above, n. 17); Sarah Lochlann Jain, “The Mortality Effect: Counting the Dead in 
the Cancer Trial,” Public Culture 22:1 (2010): 89–117; and Manderson, “Gender, 
Normality and the Post-surgical Body” (above, n. 18).
42. For earlier devaluations of the body, see Elizabeth Spelman, “Woman as Body: 
Ancient and Contemporary Views,” in Feminist Theory and the Body (above, n. 14), pp. 
32–41, who notes that for Plato, “[t]he body’s relation to the soul is such that we are to 
think of the body vis-à-vis the soul as a tomb.”
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cognitans (the mind) is the seat of intelligence, animation, spiritual-
ity, and selfhood, and res extensa (the body) is viewed as a machine 
and generally is limited to causal analysis of functioning. The body 
is devalued in this formulation and perceived as matter to be gov-
erned and regulated by the mind. 
 Together, the accounts I reference show that for the individual 
diagnosed with cancer, the body is situated as pathological and as 
separate from the self that must be protected; the body is “other” 
to the self. At the same time, however, cancer is interestingly con-
structed as other to the body; for instance, in the broader social dis-
course, cancer is said to “invade” or “infiltrate” the body, as if it were 
something that attacked from an external position or is not part of 
the body.43 In medical terms, however, we know that cancer devel-
ops when the cell growth and division essential for life neglects all 
growth-control mechanisms and the cells themselves lack the “dif-
ferentiated, specialized traits of their ancestors.”44 Undifferentiated, 
these cells do not have the representative characteristics of other 
cells of the organ that houses them, and they replicate until they 
outnumber healthy cells. So, precisely because cancer models new 
cell division and only develops when the body fails to recognize 
these undifferentiated cells, cancer is of the body as much as it is an 
internal outsider. 
 But the individual in breast cancer is generally seen, both by 
themselves and the medical arena, as subject to terrorist cells that 
have gone rogue—“guilty cells” that, as Susan Gubar remarks, “can-
not be tolerated.”45 The individual is often perceived as at the mercy 
of their body, and ultimately they become eclipsed by the body (the 
somato-ontology) that must be disciplined. The body becomes the 
focus of medical intervention; viewed as disordered, precarious, or 
chaotic, it is positioned as a docile medical object. In “Welcome to 
Cancerland,” for instance, Ehrenreich remarks on this operation, 
stating that it was “not the presence of cancer [that was shocking] 
but the absence of me—for I . . . do not enter into it even as a lo-
cation, a geographical reference point . . . I have been replaced by 
it, is the surgeon’s implication. This is what I am now, medically 
43. Cancer is said to invade from within, however. See Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor 
and AIDS and Its Metaphors (New York: Picador, 1989, p. 15), who notes that cancer has 
been represented as that which “‘spreads’ or ‘proliferates’ or is ‘diffused.’”
44. Harold Varmus and Robert A. Weinberg, cited in Stacey, Teratologies (above, n. 13), 
p. 80. 
45. Susan Guber, “In the Chemo Colony,” Critical Inquiry 37:4 (2011): 652–670, quote 
on p. 652.
Ehlers / the Dialectics of Vulnerability 125
speaking.”46 With the cancer occupying medical attention, the tu-
mor is the patient. And women themselves, as Hallowell notes in 
her study, distance themselves from the body that is seen to have 
betrayed: “their body [was viewed as] essentially compromised . . . 
it contained the seeds of its own destruction. They perceived their 
bodies as potentially out of control and constructed their breasts as 
biological ‘time bombs’ which could go off at any moment.”47 The 
consequence of these positionings is that the body is viewed as for-
eign and estranged, as alien to the self. 
 If the body threatens the subject and renders them vulnerable, 
treatment can be seen as endeavoring to reassert bodily control, 
whether it be in the form of surgery, chemotherapy, and/or radia-
tion and subsequent hormone therapy. Yet, with treatment, as Eh-
renreich laments, “the dumb old body is . . . transmogrified into 
an evil clown—puking, trembling, swelling, surrendering significant 
parts, and oozing post-surgical fluid.”48 These efforts to “know” and 
establish mastery over the body, then, render it unrecognizable—
augmenting its estrangement and possibly leading to increasing 
alienation. Cancer therapies that seek to mitigate vulnerability actu-
ally make the body more vulnerable through what Jain has called 
treatment injury: the damage and pain sustained to the body via 
treatment because more often that not, it is the treatment for can-
cer that produces a state of tangible illness, rather than the cancer 
itself.49 This necessarily raises the questions of how risk and vulner-
ability are evaluated, and which risks and states of vulnerability 
are endowed with greater importance, even if the aim is to avert 
untimely death. For instance, for Gubar, “[n]ot dread of cancer or 
death but rather dread of treatments has me in its thrall.”50 
 Key in this treatment are those procedures where bits of the body 
that put the subject at risk or make the body vulnerable are cut out 
or off (through lumpectomy or mastectomy) in order to preserve 
46. Ehrenreich, “Welcome to Cancerland” (above n. 10), p. 44.
47. Hallowell, “Reconstructing the Body or Reconstructing the Woman?” (above, n. 
15), p. 162.
48. Ehrenreich, “Welcome to Cancerland” (above n. 10), p. 44.
49. Jain, “The Mortality Effect” (above, n. 41), p. 93. By this, Jain refers to “how the 
bodies of cancer patients have been caught up and used in struggles that relate often 
only marginally to a larger cultural effort to find a cure for cancer” (p. 96), and the 
physical effects of these treatments on the body.
50. Guber, “In the Chemo Colony” (above, n. 45), p. 655. Obviously, I am not 
suggesting that breast cancer treatment should be abandoned; rather, I simply want to 
consider the frames through which we view vulnerability.
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the perceived whole. Corporeal vulnerability is therefore managed 
through the removal of what are seen as “dangerous parts” that 
could destroy the self—they are, consequently, cast as separate. As 
Broom and Kavanagh have stated, “[h]er body could be dissected, 
hazardous parts identified and removed, while the self remained—
no longer under threat from the body.”51 These surgeries in them-
selves, however, compromise notions of wholeness, most particu-
larly with mastectomy, where women often recount that they have 
“lost” parts of their body that are essential to their conceptualiza-
tions of femininity.52 The surgically altered body is, then, a dis-
rupted body. For through surgery, the very threshold of the body is 
retraced—where it begins and ends is redrawn. As Manderson argues 
in her study of the post-surgical body, what remains after surgery 
acts as a sign of bodily failure or decay.53 The scarring from these 
procedures is testimony of “what was”: the pre-surgical body that 
is discursively constructed as being in an a priori natural state. Not 
only rendering the body less familiar and incomplete to the sub-
ject, however, this surgical sacrificing also opens the body up to in-
creased vulnerability through the possibilities of infection, necrosis, 
and the agony of having significant portions of the body sliced off. 
 In their affective histories, Ehrenreich, Sedgwick, and Stacey each 
note that the body is also rendered alien through chemotherapy, 
which wards against its vulnerability to cancer even as it increases 
other forms of corporeal vulnerability. Infused with vast amounts 
of chemical “cocktail,” the subject is healed (of cancer) while the 
body is poisoned, with all rapidly producing cells beginning to die, 
along with the targeted cancer cells. Within the first few weeks af-
ter the first dose of chemotherapy, the subject will usually lose her 
hair, first on the head, then on all other parts of the body until last, 
the eyebrows and eyelashes fall out, effectively “disappearing” the 
face. These drugs are known to cause nausea, anti-emetics to cause 
constipation, constipation drugs to cause weakened bowel muscles 
and often dependency, and steroids (used as part of the chemo-
therapy drug regime) cause the body to bloat and generally lead to 
substantial weight gain. And, because it is increasingly in danger of 
51. Broom and Kavanagh, “Embodied Risk” (above, n. 17), p. 442.
52. See Hallowell, “Reconstructing the Body or Reconstructing the Woman?” (above, 
n. 15). This will necessarily be conditioned by how the subject identifies. The sentiment 
I have outlined, however, is the dominant recursive narrative in broader breast cancer 
culture and in general public perceptions of breast cancer. See Zak Szymanski, “Breast 
Chance for Survival: A Boy Dyke Faces Cancer and Fights for Proper Care of the Breast 
She Never Wanted Anyway,” Curve 12:4 (2002), pp. 34-37, for a critical alternative to 
this narrative. 
53. Manderson, “Gender, Normality and the Post-surgical Body” (above, n. 18), p. 382.
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infection from a low white-blood count and febrile neutropenia, the 
boundaries of this body require vigilant monitoring and protection. 
This body looks different, it feels different—the skin is sensitive 
to the touch—it functions differently, unrecognizably, its habitual 
ways interrupted. 
 Together, these side effects of chemotherapy and the altered post-
surgical corporeal terrain heighten the recursive narratives of the 
cancerous body as that which challenges the subject’s ability to “be,” 
in the Butlerian sense, or, in Cohen’s terms, threaten the integrity of 
the subject; vulnerable to breast cancer, the body endangers the sub-
ject. The body is positioned as a failed mechanism that must be mas-
tered. Simultaneously, however, abating the somato-ontology of vul-
nerability—mitigating this internal threat—exposes the embodied 
subject to external threats (that resonate as threats in/to the body), 
making the body more vulnerable, more exposed, putting the body 
at increased risk. And each of these treatments/strategies are deemed 
necessary and justifiable by both medical knowledge and individu-
als, it would seem, due to the general organizing logic that para-
doxically insists that bodily vulnerability must be defended against 
by whatever means possible in order that the self might persist. 
Corporeal Contingencies: Vulnerability as a  
Relational Ontology
Sedgwick has remarked, in regard to her own experience of breast 
cancer, that the body is subjected to treatment “in the service of 
imagining and recovering . . . [the] ‘natural’ healthy body in the face 
of its spontaneous and endogenous threat against itself.”54 More 
than this, however, the aim and/or assumptive logic of cancer treat-
ment is to recover the old self—that is, the pre-diagnostic or pre-
surgical self. Body and self are again reinscribed as separate entities, 
and the self is constructed as that which can only be reestablished 
through disciplining, mastering, and normalizing the body and re-
turning it to its perceived natural state, where the somato-ontology 
of vulnerability is controlled by the self. Vulnerability might thus 
be said to produce, in part, the mind/body split. As I have noted, 
however, efforts to return the body to its prior state make it more 
vulnerable, with treatment producing what Stacey calls an “‘alien’ 
body taken over by another.” This now “unfamiliar body . . . refuses 
the usual behaviours . . . [and] has lost its form and its integrity.”55 
 This estrangement is the corporeal aftermath of breast cancer 
treatment protocols that forever alter the bodily terrain. But the 
54. Sedgwick, “Breast Cancer” (above, n. 14), p. 154.
55. Stacey, Teratologies (above, n. 13), p. 85.
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vulnerability and estrangement produced through such treatment 
can be seen to be productive, in that they: 1) refuse the possibility 
of a “natural body”; 2) collapse the organizing oppositions through 
which embodied subjectivity is understood; and 3) demand a con-
scious intimacy with the body, showing the impossibility of the 
separation of self and corporeality. This simultaneous double opera-
tion—where vulnerability produces and forecloses the mind/matter 
binarism—represents the dialectics of vulnerability and highlights 
the interaction and mutual constitution (or, at least, mutual condi-
tioning) of a range of seemingly incommensurable modes of being. 
I want to suggest, then, that rather that thinking in terms of the 
medico-discursive model that positions vulnerability as a somato-
ontology to be abated and the body as a docile object to be disci-
plined and aggressively rehabilitated back to be in line with domi-
nant norms, vulnerability would be more productively understood 
as a relational ontology. Instead of proposing set boundaries to be re-
asserted and states to be controlled, a relational ontology highlights 
the relations between supposedly distinct states. In such a frame-
work, the somato-ontology of corporeal vulnerability still needs to 
be addressed (the body is always-already physiologically vulnerable), 
but a space is opened up to grapple with the relations between flesh 
and self and between bodies and knowledge. Thinking of vulner-
ability as a relational ontology means looking at the arranged sepa-
rations of mind/body, self/flesh, organic/inorganic, order/disorder, 
inside/outside, and life/death that fail or collapse in the face of ill-
ness.56 It would be to acknowledge the complicated enmeshment of 
seemingly disparate states, and to think through how the body and 
subject are always engaged in a mutually generative relation. 
56. The blurring of such boundaries has been the focus of considerable academic 
inquiry. For instance, Donna Haraway’s seminal work explores these ideas in relation 
to the cyborg body (see Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature [New 
York: Routledge, 1990]); Annemarie Mol refutes the idea of an ontological body and 
instead advances an account of the “body multiple,” which is always co-constituted 
through and in relation to the objects and bodies around it (The Body Multiple: Ontology 
in Medical Practice [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002]); and Susan Merrill 
Squier has explored how traditional understandings of the human body and its limits 
are being transformed through recent biomedical advances (Liminal Lives: Imagining the 
Human and the Frontier of Biomedicine [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004]). 
While each of these accounts lend considerable weight to understandings of 
corporeality and bodily being in the world, they do not help think through the 
particular boundary collapses that are initiated through cancer and its subsequent 
treatments. The text that most clearly does this is Stacey’s Teratologies (above, n. 13). 
For this reason, I have focused on her work here and the range of affective histories and 
ethno-critical accounts that foreground breast cancer.
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 Breast cancer treatment troubles the very possibility of a suppos-
edly distinct and natural body by instead compelling an embodied 
reality that is a composite of organic and inorganic, biological and 
technological, living and dead, highlighting that these concepts are, 
in fact, porous. For instance, chemotherapy requires that the body 
be inserted with a peripheral cannula in the hand and rigged up to 
multiple intravenous drips that administer drugs. If this is considered 
undesirable, or easy access to a vein is ruled out, the subject might 
be implanted with a port-a-cath. This small device (installed under 
the skin in the upper chest) becomes a permanent part of the body 
until the patient has completed treatment, it literally functioning 
as a corporeal portal; it acts as a new threshold for the body, a me-
chanical device through which blood can be extracted and medicine 
introduced. Surgery for mastectomy produces further permutations 
of supposed corporeal naturalness: the body will be attached to a 
pain-pump—an infusion device that delivers controlled amounts of 
local anesthetics to the patient for pain management—and most pa-
tients have surgical drains implanted in order to remove blood and 
lymphatic fluids from the surgery site. The patient is required to ma-
neuver with one to six drains (measuring usually about one to two 
meters in length) until the drainage flow has slowed to an accept-
able level, modifying the bodily movements to account for the new 
appendages. And for those undergoing breast reconstruction with 
silicone or saline implants, the body is literally remade through the 
incorporation of inorganic materials. During reconstruction using 
implants, the patient will first have expanders placed under the pec-
toral muscles; these are silicone shells that are gradually expanded 
(usually over a period of three to six months) with injections of sa-
line, made through a portal to the shell (which is a magnetic device 
so that it can be detected under the skin), stretching both muscle 
and skin to accommodate an implant. After being fully expanded, 
these implants are removed and permanent silicone (and less often 
saline) implants are placed. Post-surgery, then, the body is lived as 
an amalgam or assemblage, its boundaries and interior reconfigured 
through the treatments it undergoes.
 The vulnerability produced through treatments and surgeries for 
cancer also troubles, indeed collapses the organizing oppositions 
through which embodied subjectivity is understood. The perceived 
binary of corporeal order/disorder, for instance, is a primary exam-
ple; in relation to the body, order can be said to represent supposed 
corporeal wholeness and the uninterrupted “natural” function-
ing of the organic body. Disorder here would represent chaos and 
signals the body’s disintegration, disarray, or inability to function 
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‘naturally’. But some forms of breast reconstruction upset this dis-
tinction through the harvesting and reuse of patients’ own parts and/
or the biological material of others. AlloDerm®—which is donated 
human skin tissue from cadavers—is routinely used in U.S. breast-
reconstruction procedures to create an organic sling under silicone 
implants, to hold them in place and create a more natural infra-
mammary fold. And growing numbers of women are opting for re-
construction without implants, choosing instead to undergo proce-
dures—collectively known as autologous flap reconstruction—that 
use tissue and muscle from the patient’s buttocks, stomach, back, 
or thighs to create new breast mounds with fully functioning blood 
supply. Out of disarray and fleshy rearrangements, then, a whole, 
ordered, and naturally functioning “organic body” is produced. 
 Additionally, the strict inside/outside opposition through which 
the body is conceptualized is disturbed through the diagnosis, treat-
ment, and process of living in cancer prognosis. As I have already 
mentioned, in and out is blurred in the very detection of cancer, 
a disease that is constructed as the “other” within. The cancer tu-
mor itself can protrude from the body, enlarging organs, breaking 
through skin, and making the inside come out. And, as Stacey notes, 
chemotherapy can lead to the inability to regulate the thresholds 
between the inside of the body and its exterior: with the side effects 
of chemotherapy, “the body’s flows are set in reverse: where food 
should enter, vomit exits; where waste should exit, suppositories 
enter.”57 Cancer, then, confounds the oppositions of me/not me, 
self/other, subject/object—representing, instead, what Stacey calls 
“the horror of undifferentiation.” 
 Finally, the life/death dyad is displaced by cancer. The diagno-
sis of cancer signals death through what appears as the first signs 
of life: cell division and growth. And to live in prognosis—where 
vulnerability becomes a certainty—means that the roulette of fu-
turity/life becomes structured by and contained within the omi-
nous foretelling of death. To live in prognosis, then, is to live with 
(the presence of) death, highlighting that these are not exclusive 
states.58 The treatment for cancer only augments this slippage: the 
“bodily turmoil” it produces, Stacey suggests, “has no definite re-
57. Stacey, Teratologies (above, n. 13), p. 84.
58. Breast cancer, specifically, cannot be “cured.” On life in cancer prognosis, see Jain, 
“Living in Prognosis” (above, n. 2). Sontag makes a compelling point in terms of the 
imbrications of life and death in cancer prognosis. She cites St. Jerome, who remarked 
that “[t]he one with his swollen belly [from cancer] is pregnant with his own death.” 
Cancer, for Sontag, then, can be viewed as “a demonic pregnancy.” See Sontag, Illness 
as Metaphor (above, n. 43), p. 14.
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sults. It promises life yet feels like the beginnings of death. It de-
stroys in order to preserve. The body is poisoned with the hope of 
recovery.”59 
 These multiple transformations of the body in breast cancer—
where embodiment becomes a composite of organic and inorganic 
and where the supposed oppositional states of order/disorder, inside/
outside, and life/death collapse—ultimately underscore that the dis-
tinction and hierarchical ordering between self and body, mind and 
matter, is an impossibility, even as it is endlessly reiterated in dis-
course. Illness itself, as Lisa Deidrich has suggested, “might be said 
to transform the slash that separates these boundaries, to make it 
[the dividing slash of the binary] vulnerable and porous.”60 The con-
sequence of the transformations of the body in prognosis—via the 
vulnerability or permeability of these supposedly distinct states—is 
the inescapable necessity to transform self-perception. For if, as Des-
cartes insisted, the perceived sovereignty of self is predicated on the 
sovereignty of corpus, living in prognosis of (and through treatment 
for) breast cancer evacuates this possibility and calls for new ways of 
understanding the self. Thinking of vulnerability in terms of a rela-
tional ontology highlights that a sense of self is produced through 
the particularities of vulnerability, and that the embodied self is not 
static, but emergent.
 The various affective histories and ethno-critical studies I have 
called on insist that to live in prognosis is to live in a state of inter-
ruption, where all familiar understandings and experiences of the 
embodied self go up for grabs. It is impossible to return to the prior, 
uninterrupted state because breast cancer prognosis functions to 
contain the embodied self in a now-evident state of lifelong risk. 
This is not a disease for which there is a “cure,” and this in itself 
necessarily initiates a hesitant relation to the body. To persist, then, 
means to actively address and attend to the precarity of the body 
through thinking the body. Most specifically, this might take the form 
of being compelled to negotiate the vulnerable body through a very 
conscious embodiment and cultivated bodily intimacy. Stacey talks 
of her resistance to this necessity, experiencing a “nostalgia for a 
time when . . . [her] body had a less obtrusive presence in . . . [her] 
consciousness.”61 But the body is now always present—a “constant 
 
59. Stacey, Teratologies (above, n. 13), p. 85.
60. Lisa Deidrich, “A Bioethics of Failure: Anti-heroic Cancer Narratives,” in Ethics of 
the Body (above, n. 2), pp. 135–152, quote on p. 145
61. Stacey, Teratologies (above, n. 13), p. 100.
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awareness of physicality . . . accompanied by the knowledge of its 
fragility.”62 
 Throughout the accounts I have called on here, the vulnerable 
body—its capacity and incapacity, potentiality and limitation—be-
comes the only reality when living in breast cancer prognosis and 
treatment. As Stacey argues, the diagnosis of cancer initiates a rec-
ognition that “this matter is all I am,” and this matter is constantly 
changing.63 During chemotherapy, she tells of how daily life be-
comes confined to the rhythms of the body, with the subject oc-
cupied with corporeal sensations: of chemicals coursing through 
the body, of exhaustion, puking, swelling, a distended stomach, low 
white-blood count, painful hair loss, thrush of the mouth, skin abra-
sions, and so on. And, as I have remarked above, these changes to 
the body render it alien. But despite this, the alien body must be 
lived; in order to persist, the subject must find ways to reconcile this 
altered embodiment. 
 One of the most apparent ways this negotiation of the vulnerable 
body occurs is through the experience of mastectomy and breast 
reconstruction, where a consciousness of the body’s altered state re-
quires that the subject rework their being in the world. In studies 
conducted by Samantha Crompvoets64 and Lenore Manderson and 
Lesley Stirling,65 for instance, mastectomy is seen to radically trans-
form not only the subject’s relation to the body, but also the body/
self’s boundedness and relation to space. This can be seen, for in-
stance, in that following mastectomy, women must become familiar 
with a body with new contours, affecting the way their body feels 
(and looks) with a suddenly flattened chest and altering how they 
wear clothes, how their body meets other bodies, and how they nav-
igate the peripheries of their body, with objects literally further way. 
In addition to boundaries needing to be reworked, the subject must 
regulate their movements, ones that become hesitant as the subject 
protects the newly surgically altered body. With possibly damaged 
pectoral muscles and radical damage to the chest, the subject must 
relearn to move their arms and regain range of motion. And, if miss-
ing lymph nodes, the subject is required to negotiate ways to move 
the body carefully (through restricting weight-bearing, preventing 
perforations to the skin, and possibly wearing a compression sleeve 
62. Ibid., p. 101.
63. Ibid., p. 85.
64. Crompvoets, Breast Cancer and the Postsurgical Body (above, n. 6). 
65. Lenore Manderson and Lesley Stirling, “The Absent Breast: Speaking of the 
Mastectomied Body,” Feminism and Psychology 17:1 (2007): 75–92.
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for common activities) to avoid the threat (or effects) of lymph-
edema. These changes might be further altered with reconstruc-
tion, where prosthetic breasts once again transform the supposed 
bounded terrain of the body. These implants will perhaps take up 
different space, feel different to “natural breasts,” and due to nerve 
damage to the area (and generally the removal of a nipple), they will 
lack sensation.66 But while boundaries, movement, sensation/touch, 
and, necessarily, visual appearance are thus challenged through re-
construction, the prosthetic breast implant need not be viewed or 
experienced as a substitution for a part that is seen to be missing. 
Rather than existing as a separate, foreign appendage, the breast im-
plant is often subjectively lived: it might be integrated structurally, 
in that it now becomes part of the whole; functionally, in that it con-
tributes the subject’s overall movement through the world; and aes-
thetically, in that it becomes a part of the subject’s projected visual 
field. In these ways, while the prosthetic breast might initially be 
experienced as foreign and as that which the subject must be more 
conscious of, with time it may be incorporated.67
 But while the habitual everyday/lived altered embodiment from 
breast cancer treatment might lead to incorporation, it might also 
produce a range of other responses. These may include a continual 
mourning over permanent loss: perhaps for eyelashes that refuse to 
return after chemotherapy; for the now-shy nipple that retreats af-
ter radiation and cannot be coaxed outwards again; for the absent 
breast(s) or the “natural breast” that reconstruction fails to approxi-
mate. Or, these changes might initiate a sense of continual surprise 
and wonder: at the ongoing transformations of the body; the ability 
of the body to regenerate; or the capacity of corporeal reworkings. 
 Regardless of the particularities of the individual’s response, the 
affective histories and ethno-critical studies I have drawn on here 
suggest that the vulnerability produced through breast cancer prog-
nosis compels a transformation of self in relation to the body. While 
treatment might labor to resuscitate the normalized, pre-diagnostic 
body/self, life must now be consciously lived through the vulner-
able body. And one’s sense of self becomes shifting and precarious 
in light of matter/body that is constantly changing through surgery, 
66. For details of the different types of breast reconstruction, see http://www 
.breastreconstruction.org/index.htm. See also Nadine Ehlers, “Tekhne– of Reconstruction: 
Breast Cancer, Norms, and Fleshy Rearrangements,” Social Semiotics 22.1 (2012): 121–
141.
67. Vivian Sobchack, “A Leg to Stand On: Prosthetics, Metaphor, and Materiality,” in 
The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural Future, ed. Marquard 
Smith and Joanne Morra (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 17–42. 
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treatment, and ongoing threat. This means that the persistence of 
self becomes a daily exercise lived in relation to the altered and al-
tering body; it means that in order to live, a critical responsibility to 
self must be worked on, in, and through the body. 
Coda: Living in Vulnerability 
This compelled transformation of self in relation to and through the 
body comprises what can be thought of as the art of being or living 
in prognosis, where the subject actively formulates ways of being 
or capacities of operation that renegotiate embodied subjectivity in 
light of the changes initiated by diagnosis, treatment, and prognos-
tic projections. The examples I have examined here highlight that 
the vulnerability of the body (when living with breast cancer) oper-
ates dialectically to both foreclose and produce certain ways of being 
in the world. In such an understanding, vulnerability can be viewed 
as a relational ontology, where the altered and always-altering cor-
poreal terrain becomes the condition for a very particular form of 
subjectivity. The acute experience of vulnerability necessitates and, 
indeed, inaugurates the production of a certain (new) sense of self: 
no longer able to take the body or the future for granted—as absent, 
compliant, or a given—the subject instead grapples with vulnerabil-
ity and precarity to find new ways of living. This activity produces a 
specific experience and understanding of self. Moreover, this activ-
ity is a practice—it is a form of labor, an art, one that never ends be-
cause of the impossibility of return. In Foucauldian terms, the rela-
tional ontology of vulnerability might engender a critical ontology 
of the self, where “the critique of what we are is at one and the same 
time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and 
an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”68 
 Medical discourse provides little room for productively engag-
ing with the messiness and precarity produced through living in 
prognosis. As I have argued, medicine is more concerned with im-
posing limits—relegating the mind and body as distinct—and with 
positioning vulnerability as a somato-ontology to be abated and/or 
disciplined. It is this idea that has also become dominant in breast 
cancer culture and public campaigning about the disease, and the 
survivor narrative, which is so central to much of this campaigning, 
is largely predicated on this medical organizing logic. It takes a re-
lentlessly triumphalist approach, focusing on “fighting” and “over-
coming” cancer. In doing so, public breast cancer rhetoric rehearses 
68. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 3: The Care of the Self, trans. R. Hurley 
(New York: Vintage, 1988), p. 50. 
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the mind/body dualism and the imperative to vanquish—that is, to 
gain mastery over, to defeat, or to subdue—corporeal vulnerability. 
 Both the medical and dominant public approach to breast cancer 
can be seen, then, to present bounded models of human subjectiv-
ity and the body: they limit agency to a sovereign model (where the 
self is masterful and proprietor of the body), and they shut down 
the possibility of being open to uncertainty. However, if vulnerabil-
ity—the experience of being exposed to that which is out of our 
control—is central to life in prognosis, it becomes imperative to at-
tend to this reality, both at the individual level and in the breast 
cancer politics that occupies the public arena. Only then would it 
be possible to begin to think about vulnerability as an enabling con-
dition, one that produces particular modalities of self and perhaps 
articulations of community. And only then would it be possible to 
do justice to those living with breast cancer. Embracing, rather than 
attempting to discipline vulnerability (as a concept and as a reality) 
might, indeed, engender the critical politicization of vulnerability in 
relation to breast cancer and function as the place from which a rad-
ically altered/reconceived public breast cancer politics proceeds.69 
Such a politics would not focus on triumphalism, it would not seek 
sovereignty or control (in the sense of trying to master or overcome 
cancer or the body), nor would it seek to return subjects to a state 
of “naturalness,” “wholeness,” or “order.” Instead, it would make 
visible the terror, grief, and bodily turmoil initiated by the cancer 
diagnosis, forge a space to wrestle with precarity and uncertainty, 
and seek ways to live otherwise with vulnerability. This would be 
ethico-political work around the issue of cancer; it would, perhaps, 
function ultimately as a lived ethics of vulnerability, foregrounding 
critical responsibility toward oneself, one’s life, the lives of others, 
and the life of the community.
69. As I have noted above (in footnote 9), vulnerability has been politicized in the 
theoretical arena and seen as the site from which a potential ethics might emerge. This 
has been particularly evident in the fields of disability studies, environmental studies, 
and material feminism. Most recently, studies of biomedicine and bioethics have taken 
a renewed interest in the theorization of vulnerability and its accompanying ethics 
(see, for instance, the 2012 special issue “On Vulnerability” of the International Journal 
of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (vol. 5, no. 2). My point here, however, is that the 
empirical terrain of breast cancer activism must attend to and acknowledge the corporeal 
vulnerability of breast cancer patients and use this as a platform for public politics. The 
stakes of not doing so is that vulnerable lives—often lives in elegy—are denied or 
overshadowed.
